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Abstract 
Since World War II, the executive branch has dominated foreign policy and national 
security decisions, expanding war powers well beyond the president’s constitutional 
purview. Aided by a complicit Congress, the president has bypassed the legislator and 
unilaterally prosecuted some of the United States’ bloodiest conflicts. Continuing this 
tradition of executive overreach, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) on September 14, 2001, which ostensibly empowered the 
president to pursue those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, namely al Qaeda and the 
nations supporting them. However, the broadly-worded force authorization and equally 
far-reaching legal interpretations by the executive branch turned the AUMF into a nearly 
limitless authorization. Since its passage, the AUMF has provided the legal backstop for 
the war in Afghanistan, drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, 
National Security Agency surveillance, and the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. 
Enabled by the AUMF, the “war on terror” has eroded civil liberties, allowed 
extrajudicial killings, and transformed the conflict with al Qaeda war without end. In 
order to end the destructive legacies of the war on terror and begin to reverse the trend of 
executive overreach, Congress and the president should repeal the AUMF and update the 
force authorization regime.  
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Introduction: 
On September 14, 2001, just days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center, both houses of the United States Congress passed the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Against Terrorists, now known in shorthand as the AUMF, with only a 
single vote against.
1
 The lone dissenter, Representative Barbara Lee from California’s 
13
th
 district, who was still a relatively junior representative at the time, voiced her deep 
concern and trepidation over the proposed bill.
2
 Arguing for restraint, Lee urged, “There 
must be some of us who say, let’s step back for a moment and think through the 
implications of our actions today—let us more fully understand their consequences.” She 
continued, “We cannot respond in a conventional manner. I do not want to see this spiral 
out of control . . . If we rush to launch a counterattack, we run too great a risk that 
women, children, and other non-combatants will be caught in the crossfire.”3 Lee then 
closed her speech with an aphorism she had heard earlier in the day from priest Nathan 
Baxter during a memorial service for the victims of the attack: “As we act, let us not 
become the evil that we deplore.”4  
The AUMF in its original form has remained intact and relatively uncontested for 
over 12 years. John Bellinger III, close advisor to Condoleezza Rice and the Bush 
Administration and critic of the legislation, said, “[The AUMF] is like a Christmas tree. 
                                                          
1
 This paper will use the abbreviation “AUMF” to refer to the “Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force,” Public Law 107-40, September 18, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf>. 
2
 Gregory D. Johnsen, “60 Words and a War Without End: The Untold Story of the Most Dangerous 
Sentence in U.S. History,” Buzzfeed, January 16, 2014, <http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60-
words-and-a-war-without-end-the-untold-story-of-the-most>. 
3
 Barbara Lee, “Rep. Barbara Lee’s Speech Opposing the Post 9-11 Use of Force Act,” Waging Peace, 
September 14, 2011, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/09/14_lee-speech.htm>. 
4
 Ibid. 
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All sorts of things have been hung off of those 60 words.”5 Since its passage in 2001, the 
AUMF has provided the legal underpinnings for the prosecution of the war in 
Afghanistan, the detention of suspected enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, the drone 
strike program in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, and the NSA surveillance program.
6
 
In a May 2013 speech to the National Defense University, President Obama cautioned 
against “[continuing] to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional 
armed conflicts between nation states,” and voiced his desire to “[engage] Congress and 
the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”7 
But President Obama failed to specify what an amended or entirely new AUMF would 
look like, and debates in legal, political, and moral realms still persist as to whether the 
U.S. government should repeal, replace, amend, or keep the current authorization.  
This paper aims to frame the AUMF debate within the historical trend of the 
consolidation of war powers in the executive branch. In the development of this gradual 
power shift, the AUMF represents a bridge too far by establishing new heights of 
executive overreach. In order to repel the steady march of the imperial presidency, 
Congress should repeal the AUMF and establish a system of force authorizations that 
engage Congress through statutory measures. Part I of this paper will analyze pro-
Executive and pro-Congress interpretations of war powers and the historical trend toward 
the consolidation of warmaking authority in the executive branch. Part II will explain the 
AUMF in the context of this historical trend and explain how this legislation has set new 
                                                          
5
 Johnsen, “60 Words and a War Without End.” 
6
 All of these topics will be discussed at length throughout the paper.  
7
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” National Defense 
University, Washington, D.C., May 23,2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>. 
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precedents of executive war powers. Part III will explore arguments against the AUMF to 
address the need for repeal. The final part of the paper will explore current proposals for 
reform and offer a policy recommendation.   
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Part I: Constitutional Interpretations of War Powers and Historical Trends 
Constitutional War Powers of the Legislative & Executive Branches 
While the AUMF represents a new level of executive overreach, the imbalance of 
power in the branches of the U.S. government on matters of foreign policy and national 
security has steadily increased throughout U.S. history, in spite of the original intent of 
the Framers. The Founding Fathers sought to establish a balance of power and a system 
of checks and balances in all realms of American politics, both domestic and 
international. In foreign policy and national security issues, the Constitution authorizes 
Congress to “declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” 
“to raise and support Armies,” appropriate money, and to “provide and maintain a 
Navy.”8 The Constitution also requires the President to act in certain capacities with the 
“Advice and Consent” of two-thirds of the Senate.9 The President in turn serves as 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” At the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention, James Wilson praised the overlapping war powers and said, 
“This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be 
in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for 
the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.”10 Given these 
provisions and delegations of power, the Constitution, in principle, safeguards against an 
executive acting unilaterally, risking the country’s soldiers, wealth, and interests abroad.  
                                                          
8
 Constitution of the United States, 
<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html>. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Bruce A. Ackerman et al., “Ronald V. Dellums v. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus 
Curiae of Law Professors” (1991). Faculty Publications. Paper 751. 
<http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/751>. 
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Pro-Congress Interpretations  
 Though few disagree with the constitutional establishment of checks and balances 
in some aspects of U.S. policymaking and government, many war powers scholars still 
disagree on the Framers’ intention for the delegation of war powers between the 
executive and legislative branches. Even the courts have remained generally silent in this 
debate, “especially during wartime, when the consequences of a constitutional error are 
potentially enormous.”11 “Pro-Congress” interpretations of war powers posit that the 
president is obligated by law to obtain some type of formal authorization from Congress 
before engaging in any significant military action.
12
 Looking at the original intent of the 
Constitution, pro-Congress advocates contend that the Framers separated war powers for 
fear that the president, “whose powers balloon unnaturally in wartime, has a dangerous 
incentive to contrive and publicize bogus pretexts for war.”13 Therefore, pro-Congress 
interpreters of the Constitution hope to check presidential war powers both before and 
during hostilities.  
Proponents of this interpretation do not always connect the congressional 
authorization requirement to formal declarations of war; however, they do see an 
authorization to use force as a necessary “mechanism for Congress to ‘constitutionally 
manifest its understanding and approval for a presidential determination to make war.’”14 
The President acts as Commander in Chief, but as former Virginia Senator Jim Webb 
                                                          
11
 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 7, (May 2005), 2051. 
12
Ibid., 2057.  
13
 Stephen Holmes, “John Yoo’s Tortured Logic,” The Nation, April 13, 2006, 
<http://www.thenation.com/article/john-yoos-tortured-logic>.  
14
 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2057.  
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points out, “only in the sense that he would be executing policies shepherded within the 
boundaries of legislative powers.”15 This pro-Congress interpretation vests the power to 
initiate war solely in Congress, leaving the President only two distinct powers: 
conducting a congressionally authorized war and responding to sudden or surprise 
attacks. These arguments maintain congressional supremacy in war powers and bring the 
legislative branch into the foreign policy fold by requiring the branches to work in 
tandem on national security issues.  
Pro-Executive Interpretations  
In the “pro-Executive” understanding of constitutional war powers, the president, 
as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” has broad authority 
and latitude to employ military force in response to threats, whether responsively or 
preventively, to the national security and foreign interests of the United States.
16
 These 
arguments place little emphasis on the necessity of congressional authorizations of force, 
especially in times of emergency, which call for rapid military responses. Many pro-
Executive advocates point to the Federal Constitutional Convention in 1787 as proof of 
original pro-Executive intent, when the Framers of the Constitution substituted Congress’ 
power to “make war” for an ability to “declare war.”17 Debates during the convention 
concluded that legislative processes may prove too slow to respond to sudden attacks, yet 
                                                          
15
 Jim Webb, “Congressional Abdication,” The National Interest, (March/April 2013), 8.  
16
 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military 
Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them,” Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 487, (2001), 490. 
17
 Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, “The Legality of the United States Participation in the 
Defense of Vietnam,” The Yale Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 7, (Jun. 1966), 1101. 
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many dissenters still warned against unilateral executive military action.
18
 Preeminent 
pro-Executive scholar and co-author of the AUMF John Yoo has advocated for the 
president’s “‘inherent executive power’ to decide on his own whether to ‘deploy military 
force preemptively’” and has vigorously defended the “president’s ‘right’ to ‘start 
wars.’”19 Yoo supports his pro-Executive claim with notable historical precedents and the 
argument of national self-defense through retaliation or preemptive measures to repel 
imminent attacks.  
Consolidation of War Powers in the Executive:  
a.) Presidential Action  
While constitutional law scholars debated pro-Congress and pro-Executive 
interpretations, presidents since World War II have charged ahead, consolidating power 
by setting precedents and acting autonomously in the arenas of foreign policy and 
national security. In a famous example of pro-Executive activism, a 1966 memorandum 
from President Johnson’s State Department claimed: 
Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances in 
which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain 
positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional authorization . . . The 
Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to determine whether the 
circumstances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential 
consequences so threatening to the security of the United States that he should act 
without formally consulting the Congress.
20
 
Indeed, history corroborates Johnson’s memorandum, and the trend of executive 
deployment of troops with or without congressional authorization has continued well into 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 1101. 
19
 Stuart Streichler, “Mad About Yoo, or, Why Worry about the Next Unconstitutional War?” Journal of 
Law & Politics, Vol. 24, (Winter 2008), 93-94.  
20
 Office of the Legal Adviser, 1101. 
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the 21
st
-century. In the early 1950s, President Truman prosecuted a war in Korea 
involving 250,000 American troops and, later that same decade, President Eisenhower 
sent 14,000 troops to Lebanon—all without congressional authorization.21 Not wanting to 
weaken the presidency through legislative approval, President Truman both refused to 
seek congressional authorization for his exploits in Korea and brushed aside 
congressional overtures when an authorization was offered.
22
 In 1999, President Clinton, 
also lacking congressional authorization, ordered military action in the Republic of 
Yugoslavia and claimed that he took such actions “pursuant to [his] constitutional 
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief 
Executive.”23 The resulting hostilities implicated over 30,000 American troops and 
roughly 800 U.S. aircraft, deploying over 23,000 bombs and missiles.
24
  
Another notable example occurred in 2002, when the White House Counsel’s 
Office under the Bush administration claimed that the president retained congressional 
authorization to prosecute an invasion in Iraq from the joint resolution that authorized the 
first Persian Gulf War back in 1991.
25
 At the time, a senior administration official 
explained, “We don’t want to be in the legal position of asking Congress to authorize the 
use of force when the president already has that full authority. We don’t want, in getting a 
resolution, to have conceded that one was constitutionally necessary.”26 As a secondary 
line of defense, the Bush administration issued a legal brief citing the president’s Article 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., 1101. 
22
 Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate, (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 50.  
23
 Delahunty and Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority,” 504.  
24
 Ibid., 504.  
25
 Mike Allen and Juliet Eilperin, “Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote,” Washington Post, 
August 26, 2002.  
26
 Ibid.  
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II authority as legal justification to deploy armed forces to Iraq: “Irrespective of any 
Congressional assent, the President has broad powers as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces under the Constitution that would justify the use of force in Iraq.”27 
Offering two lines of legal justification, the Bush administration was resolute in its claim 
to bypass Congress. Though Congress ultimately passed an authorization for the use of 
force in Iraq in 2002, the fact that the Bush administration considered the approval of 
Congress for an entirely different war from the one authorized 11 years prior as a 
“concession” rather than a constitutional obligation showed a stunning circumvention of 
congressional war powers. 
This trend has continued well into the Obama administration. In 2011, President 
Obama sidestepped Congress and ordered a military air campaign in Libya, causing many 
journalists and critics to speculate that President Obama had violated the War Powers 
Resolution.
28
 In a 38-page memorandum distributed to lawmakers, the White House 
defended its “constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition” and claimed 
that the President’s actions did not violate the War Powers Resolution “because U.S. 
military operations [in Libya] are distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by 
the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision.”29 However, this “constrained and 
supporting role” cost the U.S. military nearly $1 billion, raising questions about the true 
                                                          
27
 Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency, 2.  
28
 See for example Conor Friedersdorf, “Obama Fails to Justify the Legality of War in Libya,” The Atlantic, 
June 16, 2011, and Charlie Savage, “War Powers Act Doesn’t Apply for Libya, Obama Says,” The New 
York Times, June 15, 2011.  
29
 “White House Report on U.S. Actions in Libya,” June 15, 2011, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/16/us/politics/20110616_POWERS_DOC.html?ref=politics
>. 
15 
 
 
 
extent of the Obama administration’s intervention.30 Irrespective of whether or not the 
Obama Administration violated the War Powers Resolution, the White House sent the 
explanatory document after the fact and failed to engage Congress in meaningful 
dialogue before commencing the intervention. Additionally, the Obama Administration 
carried out the military intervention even though the United States did not face an 
imminent attack or threat.     
b.) Congressional Complicity 
 Bold presidential action did not occur in a vacuum. The consolidation of war 
powers resulted from an energetic executive as well as a complicit Congress. At a 2013 
conference at the Wilson Center on reasserting the role of Congress in war powers, 
Senator Bob Corker lamented the fact that “what’s happened over time with Congress in 
general is that we have no ownership whatsoever over the conflicts that exist.”31 
Polarization in the legislative branch has adversely affected its control over the power to 
initiate military action. In a general trend, legislators have pursued unachievable and 
overly idealistic policy goals, capitalized on foreign policy issues for political gains, and 
evaded political consequences in decision-making.
32
 Apart from declaring lofty grand 
strategies for appearances for presidential hopefuls, Congress has shied away from the 
important decisions, tending to place the responsibility and blame with the president.
33
 In 
their book Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, authors 
                                                          
30
 John Barry, “America’s Secret Libya War,” The Daily Beast, August 30, 2011 ,< 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/30/america-s-secret-libya-war-u-s-spent-1-billion-on-
covert-ops-helping-nato.html>.  
31
 “AUMF: Reasserting the Role of Congress,” Woodrow Wilson Center, July 11, 2013, 4.  
32
 I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American 
Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 130.  
33
 Ibid., 130. 
16 
 
 
 
I.M. Destler et al chronicle this “irresponsibility” of Congress in the foreign policy arena 
especially in the two decades following World War II, which marked the “golden years 
for the foreign-policy Establishment and for the Executive Branch” and “years of 
deference if not abstinence” for the legislative branch.34 Most notably, when President 
Truman unilaterally sent troops to Korea, Congress sat on the sidelines. Satisfied to 
receive briefings from deputy assistant secretaries of State, Congress simply acquiesced, 
as they let President Truman carry out the fourth-bloodiest war in American history.
35
  
Though the President has employed military force without the consent of 
Congress, the majority of conflicts since the Korean War have occurred with formal 
congressional authorization. Paradoxically, these congressional authorizations have 
consolidated executive power even further, because, as Stephen Holmes points out in his 
critical article of John Yoo called “John Yoo’s Tortured Logic,” “legislative complicity 
has generally proved more useful to the President than to Congress.”36 In 1964, Congress 
passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized the President to “take all 
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and 
to prevent further aggression” and provided the legal foundation for the prosecution of 
the Vietnam War.
37
 Compared to previous congressional authorizations of force in both 
declared and undeclared wars, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, until its repeal in 1971, 
was “arguably broader or at least more open-ended with respect to targets and purpose.”38 
With the exception of two dissenting senators, including Senator Wayne Morse who 
                                                          
34
 Ibid., 130. 
35
 Ibid., 130. 
36
 Holmes, “John Yoo’s Tortured Logic.” 
37
 “The Wars for Vietnam: The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6-7, 1964,” Vassar 
College, accessed April 27, 2014, <http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc9.html>. 
38
 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2076. 
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warned against the “great mistake in subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the 
United States,” the resolution passed easily.39 With its far-reaching implications, the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution perfectly illustrated Congress’ deference to the President in issues 
of war and national security, whether the President consulted the legislative body or not.    
These harsh criticisms of congressional deference in the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution are usually tempered with the apologetic claim that the force authorization led 
to the War Powers Resolution, which ultimately curbed presidential discretion in 
initiating war. In 1973, Congress passed the resolution and overrode a veto from 
President Nixon. The legislation limited Presidential deployment of troops without 
congressional authorization to sixty days. After its passage, members of Congress 
trumpeted a great victory for the reclamation of war powers in the legislative branch.
40
 
The first part of the War Powers Resolution claims that the law guarantees “that the 
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction 
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”41 The landmark legislation did mark a 
distinct line in the sand, at least rhetorically, for the expanding executive war powers. 
However, a 2012 Congressional Research Service report on presidential compliance with 
the War Powers Resolution concluded that the celebrated legislation did not have nearly 
the intended effect. From 1975 through mid-September 2012, only one out of 136 
submitted presidential reports actually triggered the time limit in section 4(a)(1) of the 
                                                          
39
 “The Wars for Vietnam: The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6-7, 1964.” 
40
 Destler, Gelb, and Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, 134.  
41
 “War Powers,” United States Library of Congress, last updated February 28, 2014, 
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>. 
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War Powers Resolution.
42
 Though many hail the legislation as a great check on the 
executive, presidential compliance has proved difficult to enforce.    
 Congressional deference, or “abdication” as former Senator Jim Webb calls it, 
and executive overreach intensified once again after the September 11 attacks with the 
“war on terror” and the passage of the AUMF. A part of the military establishment 
himself as Secretary of the Navy, Senator Webb described the political landscape 
immediately after September 11, 2001:  
Powers quickly shifted to the presidency as the call went up for centralized decision 
making in a traumatized nation where quick, decisive action was considered 
necessary. It was considered politically dangerous and even unpatriotic to question 
this shift . . . Members of Congress fell all over themselves to prove they were behind 
the troops and behind the wars.
43
 
This crisis-stricken environment gave birth to the new post-September 11 governance, 
which bolstered the pro-Executive interpretation of war powers and exacerbated the 
imbalance of power. The beginning of the new AUMF governance occurred in part 
because of congressional abdication in the critical days after the September 11 attacks. 
Despite initial pushback from a much broader White House AUMF proposal in the hours 
following the attack, Congress passed the little deliberated force authorization with only 
one dissenting vote from either house.  
After the passage of the broadly worded 2001 AUMF, members of Congress 
remained silent during the passage of the 2002 authorization for the use of force in Iraq. 
Even though Congress had voted for the use of force, many claimed that the president 
                                                          
42
 Richard F. Grimmett, “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years,” Congressional Research 
Service, September 24, 2012, < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf>.  
43
 Webb, “Congressional Abdication,” 9.  
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still held the power to decide whether or not to act on the authorization. After the vote, 
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle commented, “Regardless of how one may have 
voted on the resolution last night, I think there is an overwhelming consensus . . . that 
while [war] may be necessary, we’re not there yet.”44 Despite Senator Daschle’s 
insistence that the time had not yet come for war, once the President Bush deployed 
troops, Congress played a marginal to absent role in the proceeding events. During some 
of the most critical times of the war, the Congressional Record reveals almost no debate 
of the military engagement. In The New Imperial Presidency, author Andrew Rudalevige 
recounts his close reading of the Congressional Record during this important time:  
The Senate spent most of mid-March debating the emotionally polarizing but 
substantively limited question of partial-birth abortion procedures. The House of 
Representatives had its official photograph taken, named a room after former 
majority leader Richard Armey, and expressed its unanimous sense that fires in 
nonresidential buildings and executions conducted by stoning were bad things.
45
  
Congressional abdication came at a time when the United States could have benefitted 
the most from thoughtful dialogue and engagement.  
c.) Other Explanations 
Several phenomena may explain the consolidation of executive war power and 
congressional abdication. In the realms of waging war and maintaining national security, 
the president enjoys a potent “first-mover advantage.” With this significant advantage, 
the president may act without approval from Congress, after which “the burden lies on 
                                                          
44
 Gene Healy, “Reclaiming the War Power,” in Cato Handbook For Congress: Policy Recommendations 
for the 108
th
 Congress, Cato Institute, 112.  
45
 Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency, 1.  
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other institutions to force him to alter his policies.”46 This makes presidential military 
actions difficult to challenge because Congress must prove that the president acted well 
beyond any reasonable interpretation of congressional force authorizations. Challenging 
the executive on this front becomes all the more difficult given the commonly held 
conception that the president operates under much more informed circumstances in 
matters of national security. Such an advantage is bolstered by the “rally ‘round the flag” 
effect, in which the president gains momentum sometimes from a rise, albeit short-term, 
in approval ratings after military exploits.
47
  
With the advent of political parties, members of Congress grew even more likely 
to toe the party line and follow the president’s lead.48 Partisanship continued to intensify, 
and, as a result, members of Congress developed a much higher likelihood of voting 
along party lines. In a National Journal study completed in 2011, every Senate Democrat 
amassed a voting record more liberal than every State Republican and vice versa.
49
 These 
phenomena can allow exaggerated or even false claims of threats facing the United 
States, as the members of Congress aligned with the president in power may question war 
claims less. Many have speculated that the Johnson Administration intentionally 
misrepresented the events of the Gulf of Tonkin in order to catalyze action.
50
 Similar 
debates raged over “discredited intelligence” which had served as the basis for the war in 
                                                          
46
 Mark Tushnet, “Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, 
No. 8, (Jun., 2005), 2677.  
47
 Ibid., 2678.  
48
 In Senator Webb’s article, he remarks that “party loyalties over a range of contentious policy decisions 
became so strong that it often seemed we were mimicking the British parliamentary system, with members 
of Congress lining up behind the president as if he were a prime minister.” See Webb, “Congressional 
Authorization,” 9.  
49
 Ronald Brownstein, “Pulling Apart,” The National Journal, February 24, 2011, 
<http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/congress-hits-new-peak-in-polarization-20110224>. 
50
 Bradley and Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization, 2075. 
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Iraq.
51
 These possible explanations either enabled or aided the energetic administrations 
and deferential congressional classes since WWII. This backdrop set the stage for the 
kneejerk authorization penned after the terrorist attacks on September 11. Continuing the 
progression of executive overreach, the AUMF has pushed the executive war powers 
boundaries even further.  
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Part II: AUMF as a Bridge Too Far 
 
 Although the AUMF continues the trend toward the consolidation of warmaking 
authority in the executive branch, the law also represents a new level of executive 
overreach. In their survey of congressional authorizations of the use of force throughout 
American history, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” Curtis 
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith distinguish between limited and broad authorizations of 
force and use five components in their analysis: “(1) the authorized military resources; 
(2) the authorized methods of force; (3) the authorized targets; (4) the purpose of the use 
of force; and (5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force.”52 Adding in 
the geographical scope of the authorization, all of these analytical components, in part or 
in whole, show the AUMF as atypically broad both in how Congress wrote the law and 
how the president has subsequently interpreted it.  
A.) Targets 
One of the most contentious issues surrounding the war on terror and the AUMF 
is the methodology, or lack thereof, used for classifying and targeting enemy combatants. 
Although many disagree as to whether those who passed the AUMF intentionally gave 
the president broad discretion, many critics and observers agree that the AUMF has been 
used to legally justify the lethal targeting of a widening array of enemies. According to 
Bradley and Goldsmith’s survey of authorizations, historically speaking “all of the 
authorizations restrict targets, either expressly (as in the Quasi-War statutes’ restrictions 
relating to the seizure of certain naval vessels), implicitly (based on the identified enemy 
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and stated purposes of the authorization), or both.”53 With the AUMF, however, the 
restriction of targets exists in a grey area. The staunchest critics of the AUMF see the 
issue of targeting as the most nefarious outcome of the legislation. In “After the AUMF,” 
Jennifer Daskal and Stephen Vladeck summarize this fear and warn, “The more that the 
AUMF is used to justify the use of military force against those with no connection to the 
September 11 . . . the more it becomes an essentially limitless authorization, allowing the 
President to use force as a matter of first resort.”54  
These debates over terrorist targets began at the inception of the AUMF. On 
September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a mourning nation: 
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports 
them . . . Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated . . . And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to 
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists.
55
  
 
Statements such as this one reflect the Bush Administration’s broad interpretation from 
the outset of the scope of targets authorized by the AUMF. However, this was not the 
intention of Congress. Despite the Bush Administration’s initial efforts for broad 
discretion in terrorist targeting during the drafting of the bill, many members of Congress 
saw the AUMF as distinct from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution because the new 
legislation had authorized force only against a specific enemy.
56
 In a House debate over 
the proposed AUMF, Representative Jackson of Illinois claimed, “I am not voting ‘Yes’ 
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on September 14, 2001 for an open-ended Tonkin Gulf-type Resolution . . . I’m not 
willing to give President Bush carte blanche authority to fight terrorism.” He then 
cautioned, “Recently President Bush said that the United States ‘will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbored them.’ But we 
must make distinctions.”57  
In the view of Representative Jackson and numerous other members of Congress, 
the AUMF did not constitute a blank check force authorization, but rather a restricted 
authorization to exercise military action against only “those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”58 In his 
article “The Wrong War,” Grenville Byford makes an important distinction by separating 
wars fought against “proper nouns (Germany, say),” from the generally less successful 
“wars against common nouns (poverty, crime, drugs).”59 Based on this distinction, a 
discrepancy seems to exist between the common noun enemy of the “war on terror” and 
the proper noun targets of the AUMF from the view of Congress. In July 2013, the 
Congressional Research Service drafted a background brief on the AUMF and concluded 
that the legislation is considered groundbreaking because it “(1) empowered the President 
to target non-state actors, even to the individual level, as well as states, and (2) did not 
specify which states and non-state actors were included under the authorization.”60  
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While recognizing these new precedents, Bradley and Goldsmith make an 
important observation of the AUMF, which differs from past authorizations and war 
declarations. The authors suggest that the AUMF allows for broader interpretation of 
targets because of two provisions. By allowing the President to use military action against 
“those nations, organizations, or persons he determines have the requisite nexus with the 
September 11 attacks,” the AUMF “describes rather than names the enemies that are the 
objects of the use of force.”61 Secondly, Bradley and Goldsmith present the possibility 
that the “he determines” provision intentionally grants the President autonomy. Because 
of these significant provisions, the authors categorize the AUMF as one of the broadest 
authorizations in American history with regard to enemy targets, whether intended or not.  
Although some members of Congress viewed the requirement of targets to have 
some connection to those responsible for the September 11 attacks as a viable legal 
limitation, others viewed this nexus requirement as a feeble, inadequate safeguard. 
Eleanor Holmes Norton, a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives from the 
District of Columbia, warned during AUMF deliberations that the September 11 
reference was only a “slim anchor,” and in reality the text of the legislation “allows war 
against any and all prospective persons and entities.”62 The Bush and Obama 
Administrations’ interpretations of the AUMF to include “associated forces” of al Qaeda 
further reduced Norton’s precarious “slim anchor.” In May 2013 at the National Defense 
University, President Obama declared the United States to be at war with “al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and their associated forces.”63 When asked whether groups or individuals who 
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may have emerged after September 11 or with no connection with the attacks on 
September 11 could be legally covered under the current AUMF, Acting General Counsel 
of the Department of Defense Robert Taylor unequivocally replied, “If they become an 
associated force with al Qaeda, then they have joined with the organization that was 
responsible for those September 11 attacks and we believe they are fully covered by the 
AUMF.”64 By declaring war against both a common noun and associated forces, the 
nexus requirement faded, and the potential targets covered under the AUMF expanded. 
B.) Purpose of the Use of Force 
The broadening of targets in a military conflict to associated forces and beyond 
inherently changes the purpose of the use of force. Using the AUMF to justify the pursuit 
of targets with no connection to al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks turns the authorization into 
something else entirely. The notion of associated forces and co-belligerents is not 
historically unprecedented. In World War II, the United States was at war with Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and their co-belligerents; however, in that conflict, Congress subsequently 
declared war against the co-belligerents. By contrast, the executive branch has added co-
belligerents and associated forces into the AUMF without additional congressional 
authorization.
65
 The AUMF authorized force against al Qaeda in order to prevent future 
acts of terrorism “by such nations, organizations or persons.” The broader interpretation 
possibly changes the purpose to prevent any future acts of terrorism by any organization.  
In a speech at the Oxford Union in late 2012, U.S. Department of Defense 
General Counsel Jeh Johnson defined associated forces as “having two characteristics: 
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(1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a 
co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.”66 This idea of associated forces represents a significant legal argument to 
justify killing combatants not explicitly associated with al Qaeda. As Daskal and Vladeck 
point out:  
All three branches of the U.S. government have agreed that anyone who is a member 
of al Qaeda or the Taliban can be detained without charge, and also, according to the 
views of the past two administrations, subject to lethal force in appropriate 
circumstances.
67
 
 
Once an enemy combatant or organization acquires the label of “associated force,” the 
U.S. government may essentially employ limitless force against them, similarly to al 
Qaeda itself. Because the past two administrations have read associated forces into the 
AUMF, determining the scope of these al Qaeda offshoots has become a heated debate in 
executive overreach.  
 These debates resulted in the May 2013 Senate Committee on Armed Services 
hearing on the AUMF. During Senator Angus King’s opening remarks at the hearing, the 
Senator called the proceedings “astoundingly disturbing” and accused the representatives 
from the Pentagon of having “essentially rewritten the Constitution.”68  His main concern 
surrounded the concept of associated forces, and he remarked:  
This authorization, the AUMF, is very limited, and you keep using the term 
‘associated forces.’ You used it 13 times in your statement. That is not in the 
AUMF. And you said at one point it suits us very well. I assume it does suit you 
very well because you are reading it to cover everything and anything.
69
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Senator King’s fear, and the fear of others, holds that the executive branch might 
shoehorn any new or emerging threats into this associated forces category. Because of the 
mutable, amorphous nature of al Qaeda and related organizations, the president and the 
Pentagon enjoy a certain leeway in the categorization of these groups. In the May 2013 
Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on the AUMF, Assistant Secretary 
Sheehan testified that “these groups . . . have very murky membership and they also have 
murky alliances and shifting alliances,” and “they change their name and they lie and 
obfuscate their activities.”70 Pentagon and White House officials constantly leave the 
definition of associated forces open-ended and paint the network as a complex web of 
groups, which makes determining the nexus requirement for a lawful military strike 
incredibly difficult. Given the stated difficulty of designating groups as associated forces 
and the purported care in determining these designations, such assessments might seem 
like high-level, high-sensitivity deliberations. Yet, Assistant Secretary Sheehan reported 
that lower level officials in the Pentagon make these designations prior to presidential 
approval for the use of lethal force.
71
  
This concern of shoehorning new, disjointed threats is compounded by the fact 
that the U.S. Department of Defense keeps the list of associated forces secret.
72
 Warning 
that such a public revelation would cause “serious damage to national security,” a 
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spokesman for the Department of Defense explained the Pentagon’s rationale in keeping 
the list classified: “Because elements that might be considered ‘associated forces’ can 
build credibility by being listed as such by the United States, we have classified the list.” 
He went on, “We cannot afford to inflate these organizations that rely on violent 
extremist ideology to strengthen their ranks.”73 This justification stands on shaky ground, 
because the Pentagon has failed to give concrete evidence to back up this claim. In his 
“Lawfare Blog,” Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith brands the “soft criterion” of the 
inflation rationale as “weak,” because the acknowledgement of the U.S. government 
would likely have little bearing on already well-known groups.
74
 Additionally, the 
Department of Defense’s official acknowledgement of al Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), and elements of al Shabaab seems to run counter to this argument, as 
the Pentagon does not sufficiently explain why some groups would be inflated by 
acknowledgement rather than others.
75
 Such lack of transparency seems self-serving for 
the president, who would want to escape scrutiny from controversial drone strikes and 
other actions.
76
  
These varied legal interpretations of associated forces have led many to caution 
that the AUMF has not significantly legally limited executive discretion of enemy targets 
and the purpose of the authorization. In an article called “60 Words and a War Without 
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End: The Untold Story of the Most Dangerous Sentence in U.S. History,” Gregory D. 
Johnsen reported on the history of the AUMF and the expansion of enemy targets:  
Several of the lawyers I talked to, officials from both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations spoke eloquently and at great length about the limits of the 
AUMF and being constrained by the law. And maybe that is true. But none of 
them were able to point to a case in which the U.S. knew of a terrorist but 
couldn’t target him because it lacked the legal authority. Each time the president 
wanted to kill someone, his lawyers found the authority embedded somewhere in 
those 60 words.
77
 
 
Similarly, in a 2013 Senate hearing on the future of the AUMF, Senator Jim Inhofe 
remarked that in 10 years of briefings with members of the U.S. military on operations 
against al Qaeda and their affiliates, he had never once heard “that they lacked the legal 
authority to conduct their missions.”78 Senator Inhofe then asked Assistant Secretary for 
Special Operations Michael Sheehan if he had ever encountered a situation in which the 
special operations community “did not have sufficient legal authorization to prosecute the 
war,” to which Assistant Secretary Sheehan responded, “I have not yet once found that 
we did not have enough legal authority within the Department of Defense to prosecute 
[the war].”79 While this may show a successful vetting process in the Department of 
Defense, the lack of legal limitations may also display the absence of significant 
constraints on enemy targets.  
 Enemy targeting began a new chapter when the Obama administration carried out 
a targeted killing operation against an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, in Yemen in 
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2011.
80
 In addition to eliminating enemy combatants with tenuous ties to al Qaeda, the 
Obama administration invoked the AUMF to kill its own citizen, establishing a new legal 
precedent. However, the White House did not acknowledge these killings until May 
2013, when Attorney General Eric Holder admitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that the U.S. military had killed four American citizens since 2009.
81
  
 In response to criticisms and fears of extrajudicial killings, the executive branch 
rolled out a number of interpretations and clarifications on the AUMF and drone strikes. 
Though these white papers, fact sheets, and speeches dealt in a number of hypotheticals, 
the interpretations within showed new heights of executive power. In November 2011, 
the Department of Justice issued a white paper plainly stating that “were the target of a 
lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and the 
Fourth Amendment, that individual’s citizenship would not immunize him from a lethal 
operation.” A 2013 White House fact sheet corroborated this statement, noting that the 
Department of Justice would conduct “additional legal analysis” to ensure constitutional 
compliance. At face value, this policy may seem consistent with the domestic judicial 
process. However, as Attorney General Eric Holder clarified in a speech, the Obama 
administration has interpreted “due process” and “judicial process” quite differently.82 
According to Holder, civilian and military officials in the executive branch may carry out 
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due process solely within the executive branch and use lethal force against a U.S. citizen 
without judicial approval.
83
  
C.) Geographical Scope 
With the new level of discretion in enemy targeting comes an unprecedented, 
widening geographical region where the U.S. military carries out its operations. In his 
opening remarks at the May 2013 Senate hearing on the AUMF, Senator John McCain 
demonstrated his disbelief at the evolution of the legislation: “None of us, not one who 
voted for the AUMF, could have envisioned we were about to give future Presidents the 
authority to fight terrorism as far flung as Yemen and Somalia.”84 According to the two 
Pentagon officials, under the AUMF, the President would have the domestic authority to 
put boots on the ground in both Yemen and the Congo, because the battlefield exists 
“from Boston to the FATA.”85 This was not the first time the White House made this 
claim. A few years prior to the hearing in 2011, Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism John O. Brennan proclaimed in a speech, “The United 
States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being 
restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.”86 These statements marked a 
serious departure from the United States’ previous armed conflicts. Some representatives 
cautioned against the undefined battlefield parameters as early as the initial 
Congressional debates surrounding the AUMF on September 14, 2001. Representative 
Jesse Jackson, Jr. of Illinois warned, “As written, the resolution could be interpreted, if 
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read literally, to give the President the authority to deploy or use our armed forces 
domestically.”87 Indeed, in a letter to Senator Rand Paul, Attorney General Eric Holder 
confirmed that hypothetically, in an “extraordinary circumstance,” the President would be 
authorized to carry out a drone strike against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil.
88
  
Though Representative Jackson’s fears have not been realized, an October 2013 
raid on a coastal Somali city showcased the long reach of U.S. military operations. In an 
official statement days later, the Pentagon Press Secretary claimed that the operation had 
taken place “under legal authorities granted to the Department of Defense by the 
Authorization to Use Military Force (2001) against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”89 
In a similar statement the day before, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel declared that the 
United States military would pursue terrorists “no matter where they hide.”90 Delivering 
on this threat, the Bush and Obama administrations have invoked the AUMF to engage in 
military actions in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Georgia, Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia since the passage of the AUMF.
91
 In both practice 
and posturing, the Pentagon and the President have given no geographic limitation to the 
war on terror.  
D.) Military Resources and Methods of Force 
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 Indeterminate battlefields have coincided with unprecedented tactics and methods 
of waging war since the passing of the AUMF in 2001. Bolstered by the AUMF’s 
provision for the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force,” the in addition to 
an explosion of military resources and technology has allowed the president to further 
consolidate war powers in the executive branch. In terms of military expenditures, the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, taken together, cost between $4 and $6 trillion and 
counting, making the post-9/11 military conflicts the most expensive in United States 
history.
92
  
In his article “The True Forever War,” Council on Foreign Relations Fellow 
Micah Zenko catalogued the military technology evolution and how this development has 
afforded the president significant autonomy as well as freedom from scrutiny. On 
September 11, 2001, the United States laid claim to an arsenal of 167 drones, with only a 
“handful” carrying weapons; 12 years later, in December 2013, the Pentagon and CIA 
laid claim to an estimated 11,000 drones, hundreds of which are considered “armed-
capable.”93 Initially developed to find one man, Osama bin Laden, the drone program 
“has now been used an estimated 462 times to kill an estimated 3,600 suspected terrorists, 
militants, and civilians in countries with which the United States is not formally at 
war.”94 Similarly, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has more than 
doubled its size and budget since 9/11.
95
 The growth of rapidly expanding cyber 
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capabilities is even more difficult to estimate, given the fact that “the strategic guidance 
and supporting doctrine . . . remains secret—or more likely unresolved.” 96 And, as Zenko 
points out, size as well as the relative ease to deploy these methods have risen 
dramatically. These low-cost, low-risk, and, most notably, low-visibility methods have 
permitted the White House and the Pentagon unparalleled war powers.  
 These new wartime methods are not limited to uses of lethal force. By invoking 
the AUMF provisions to “use all necessary and appropriate force” and to “prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States,” as well as reaffirming the 
inherent power of commander in chief, the Bush and Obama administrations have acted 
with significant latitude in non-lethal activities, such as surveillance and detention even 
in the face of contradictory legislation. In 2006, the New York Times reported that the 
National Security Agency (NSA) had been carrying out a robust surveillance program on 
American citizens, all in complete disregard of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) warrant requirements.
97
 In a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the subject of 
the constitutionality of the NSA surveillance program, Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales vehemently defended the program, arguing that the president acted “with 
authority provided both by the Constitution and by statute.”98 In addition to invoking the 
oft-cited commander in chief and chief executive authorities of the president, Attorney 
General Gonzales called attention to a provision in the FISA accords, which prohibit 
government electronic surveillance “except as authorized by statute.” Congress passed 
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such a statute, Gonzales argued, in 2001 with the AUMF, which authorizes the president 
to “use all necessary and appropriate force against al Qaeda.”99 His reasoning, and indeed 
the reasoning of the Bush administration, followed that if lethal force could be 
authorized, then certainly electronic surveillance would fall well within that extreme.  
Attorney General Gonzales’ statements on NSA surveillance were subjected to 
serious debate. In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Yale Law scholar 
Harold Koh chastised the Bush Administration for implementing the NSA surveillance 
program and acting beyond its constitutional bounds. Citing the Fourth Amendment, 
which requires government surveillance to be “reasonable, supported except in 
emergency situations by warrants issued by courts, and based upon specific probable 
cause,” Koh accused the NSA surveillance program of violating the constitution on all 
three fronts.
100
 By relying on the AUMF as justification for warrantless surveillance, Koh 
argued that the executive had grabbed even more power and rendered Congress a 
“pointless rubberstamp.”101 In perhaps a testament to the AUMF as a new level of 
executive power, Koh pointed out the fact that, since the passing of FISA in 1978, no 
other administration had violated the surveillance legislation.
102
 Only with the AUMF did 
the Bush Administration feel it had the legal authority, along with the motivation, to 
violate FISA and conduct warrantless surveillance. In what looked ostensibly as a 
drawdown of executive power, Attorney General Gonzales informed Congress via letter 
that the Terrorist Surveillance Program would not be renewed, and any future 
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surveillance would “now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.”103 However, as The Guardian and the The Washington Post revealed 
in June 2013, the program had simply been replaced by a new, even more robust 
surveillance program called PRISM.
104
 
 The detention of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba represents another 
area where the AUMF enabled a bourgeoning executive power. Roughly eight hundred 
prisoners have been detained at Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp since its opening in 
2002.
105
 From its inception, the Guantanamo detention facility aimed to detain terrorism 
suspects outside of the reach of U.S. laws and courts, and potentially beyond the scrutiny 
of other federal branches.
106
 Like most of its actions in the “war on terror,” the executive 
branch has cited the AUMF and the international laws of war to legally justify the 
detentions at Guantanamo Bay.
107
 To be sure, the Guantanamo detention facility has been 
subjected to significant political scrutiny and legal challenges during its life span.
108
 And, 
like other controversial actions by the executive branch, the Obama administration has 
promised efforts to scale back and even end the detention program. However, despite 
President Obama’s May 2013 speech where he voiced his “commitment to closing 
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Guantanamo,” the controversial detention facility remained open through the end of the 
year and on into the next.
109
     
E.) Timing and Procedural Restrictions 
 In terms of timing and procedural restrictions, the AUMF is more typical of other 
authorizations for the simple reason that congressional force authorizations usually do not 
restrict timing. Force authorizations implicitly continue to hold until the United States 
defeats the stated enemy.
110
 In his majority opinion in the 2008 case Boumediene v. Bush, 
Justice Kennedy explained that “because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of 
limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers 
undefined.”111 Understandably, like past authorizations, Congress failed to provide a 
“sunset clause” or time limitation in the 2001 AUMF. The AUMF’s mandate, like others, 
implicitly ends with the end of the conflict or “cessation of active hostilities” in the words 
of the “Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War” with al Qaeda 
and its associated forces.
112
 Both supporters of presidential latitude and those seeking to 
curb executive power accept the legal justification that the war powers remain in place 
until “the enemy is declared, by an action of the political branches, to have been 
defeated.”113  However, because of the expanding scope of targets subsumed under al 
Qaeda and its associated forces and the amorphous nature of the al Qaeda threat, the 
implicit time limit defined by defeat of the enemy becomes harder to determine. As 
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evidence of these difficulties, the war in Afghanistan is already the United States’ longest 
major military conflict.
114
 Although the AUMF’s lack of time restrictions may seem in 
line with past authorizations, the open-endedness of the enemies does not lend itself to a 
clearly defined “cessation of active hostilities.” In all aspects of force authorizations, the 
AUMF has allowed the president to push the boundaries of executive war powers further 
than ever historically possible.  
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Part III: The Need for Repeal 
Arguments for Keeping the AUMF 
The AUMF has enabled an unprecedented level of power in the executive branch, 
but that fact alone does not sufficiently provide a basis for a repeal or replacement of the 
current legislation. Some proponents of the AUMF not only defend the constitutionality 
of the legislation but also praise the trend toward consolidation of power in order to 
appropriately address the atypical threat presented by terrorism. In a “Statement of 
Administration Policy” released in November 2011, the Obama administration claimed 
that “the authorities granted by the AUMF . . . are essential to our ability to protect the 
American people from the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces, and have 
enabled us to confront the full range of threats this country faces from those organizations 
and individuals.”115 The statement from the White House reflects the common refrain of 
AUMF supporters that the U.S. military can only properly face the threat posed by al 
Qaeda and its associated forces with an intentionally broad mandate. Recognition of the 
abnormality of the conflict occurred at the AUMF’s inception. During the House debates 
on September 14, 2001, even Representative Barbara Lee, the sole dissenting vote against 
the AUMF, said, “We are not dealing with a conventional war. We cannot respond in a 
conventional manner.”116  
Along this line of argument, only an ambiguous AUMF allowing for broad 
interpretation could allow the U.S. military to address the “full range” of threats posed by 
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al Qaeda and its associated forces. At the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in 2013 
Mr. Taylor reminded Congress that “the enemy in this conflict has not confined itself to 
the geographic boundaries of any one country” in this “unconventional war.”117 And, in 
dealing with this shifting threat, Assistant Secretary Sheehan assured Congress that the 
current AUMF worked and continues to work adequately: 
I think the AUMF as currently structured works very well for us. So I guess we 
would be concerned that any change might restrict our combatant commanders 
from conducting their operations they have in the past. So right now, we are 
comfortable. And I think, Senator Inhofe said if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. I would 
subscribe to that policy.
118
 
After the assassination of Osama bin Laden, many supporters of the broadly interpreted 
AUMF felt affirmed in their methods. A few days after the raid, John Yoo wrote in the 
National Review that, while the “majority of the credit for the operation that killed Osama 
bin Laden goes to the Obama administration,” “it is also a vindication of the Bush 
administration’s terrorism policies and shows that success comes from continuing those 
policies.”119 The “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” mentality has provided a solid foundation 
for proponents of the AUMF.  
 Other arguments against changing the current AUMF revolve around the idea of 
presidential and military flexibility in addressing the rapidly changing threat of terrorism 
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in general, not just al Qaeda and its associated forces. These proponents caution against 
the gridlock that may occur in Congress over wartime decisions that require rapid 
resolution, such as an emerging terrorist organization with no connection to al Qaeda. 
Even the Framers considered this potential snare of allowing Congress full wartime 
authority. In their view, the House of Representatives could prove dilatory in times of 
war because of its unwieldy size and infrequent meetings.
120
 Warnings of increased 
polarization and factionalism culminated in the 112
th
 Congress earning the dubious 
distinction of the least productive Congress of all time.
121
 The recent failures of the 
appropriately dubbed “do nothing” Congress have casted doubts over Congress’ 
capability to make real-time decisions in high-pressure war situations.  
Legal and Ethical Arguments for Changing the AUMF 
After 13 years of an untouched AUMF and a drastically changed threat landscape, 
this “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” mentality is becoming harder to legally and 
ideologically justify. Arguments for keeping the AUMF often come from a purely 
national security perspective. Critics of the AUMF frame the debate in much broader 
terms, citing the need to restore the rule of law and America’s reputation abroad in 
addition to national security concerns of securing new force authorizations to cover 
threats with no connection to al Qaeda. At its core, much of the debate over the AUMF 
and the delegation of constitutional war powers boils down to defining Justice Jackson’s 
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“equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”122 In a statement before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in 2008, Harold Koh raised the stakes even higher when he 
argued, “The Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’ has done serious and extensive 
damage to civil liberties and the rule of law in the name of national security.”123 In this 
argument against the AUMF, the legal and ethical are intertwined. Generally speaking, 
this argument holds that the new heights of executive overreach enabled by the AUMF 
and its subsequent legal interpretations have eroded civil liberties and the rule of law.
124
 
Only by maintaining the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, 
even in the arena of war powers, can the U.S. government uphold these American ideals.  
Pitfalls of a Perpetual State of War  
Another argument against the AUMF involves an understanding of the law during 
times of war and peace. According to the Congressional Research Service, declarations of 
war automatically “trigger many standby statutory authorities conferring special powers 
on the President,” as opposed to authorizations, which trigger no such standby statutory 
authorities.
125
 Despite the lack of precedent, the executive branch has continuously 
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argued that the AUMF sufficiently provides a “statutory exception.”126 Likening the force 
authorization to a war declaration and the accompanying wartime atmosphere, the Bush 
and Obama administrations perpetuated a crisis paradigm in which energetic Executive 
action is both justified and necessary. As long as the war with al Qaeda and its associated 
forces rages on, the reach of the executive branch, backed by the intact authorization, will 
and should continue expanding.  
AUMF advocates, such as Jeh Johnson, do acknowledge the existence of a 
“tipping point” at which many of the al Qaeda leadership have been killed or captured, 
and the group no longer poses a real threat against the United States.
127
 However, 
determining this “tipping point” has been the subject of significant debate. In his 
February 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama called core al Qaeda a 
“shadow of its former self,” yet mentioned the emergence and evolution of al Qaeda’s 
affiliates.
128
 Despite reducing al Qaeda to a mere “shadow,” Assistant Secretary Sheehan 
lamented that al Qaeda’s tipping point “unfortunately is a long way off” based on the 
group’s “organizational resiliency.”129 These discrepancies fuel fears of a perpetual state 
of war allowing for the open-ended AUMF to ascribe unchecked presidential war powers 
indefinitely.  
The difficulty in ascertaining and declaring the end of the conflict with al Qaeda, 
and therefore the end of the AUMF’s mandate, has both political and technical 
dimensions. For all three branches of the federal government, “pinpointing the ‘end’ of 
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such a nebulous conflict” is “fraught with political risk.”130 Declaring an end to the 
conflict inevitably raises hard-to-answer questions of victory, defeat, cost, and intent. 
Additionally, declaring an end to the conflict may imply that the United States no longer 
faces terrorist threats to its national security. Such a statement would fly in the face of 
intelligence on new and emerging terrorist threats and would open a politician up to harsh 
criticisms from more hawkish members of Congress.  
But even beyond the political difficulties, the nature of the threat posed by al 
Qaeda does not lend itself to easy analysis. In his article, “The End of al Qaeda? 
Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror,” Adam Klein discusses the complexities 
of determining an end to the AUMF’s conflict, arguing that “a binary, on/off model of 
when and how a war on terrorism ends under law does not adequately reflect the 
multifaceted nature of the overall al Qaeda threat to the United States.”131 With its many 
offshoots, affiliates, and associations, the United States cannot wage a war against one 
unified enemy but rather multiple, sometimes loosely connected enemies. Some groups 
may use the al Qaeda label for convenience, and other groups may have a similar Salafist 
and “anti-Western” agenda but no official ties to al Qaeda. In the war with al Qaeda, 
“there is no physical territory to conquer, no clear leadership structure to topple, no 
Reichstag over which to fly a foreign flag.”132 The defeat of one branch of al Qaeda, or 
even the assassination of Osama bin Laden, does not always mean definitive victory. 
                                                          
130
 Klein, “The End of al Qaeda?” 1868.  
131
 Ibid., 1867. 
132
 Stephen I. Vladeck, “Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War Without End,” 
Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Vol. 2:53, 53.  
46 
 
 
 
Because of this political and technical difficulty to determine or declare an end to the 
conflict, the AUMF’s mandate continues.  
 The difficulty in determining a cessation of hostilities has led some to declare the 
current conflict as the “forever war” or the “war without end.”133134 The pitfalls and 
dangers of a forever war are manifold. In his testimony in May 2013 to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth explained 
the importance of the war and peace distinction:  
When it comes to our most basic rights, there is probably no more important 
distinction than the line between peace and war. In peacetime, the government can 
use lethal force only if necessary to stop an imminent threat to life, and it can 
detain only after according full due process. But in wartime, the government can 
kill combatants on the battlefield, and it has greatly enhanced power to detain 
people without charge or trial. So, safeguarding the right to life and liberty 
depends in important part on ensuring that the government is not operating by 
wartime rules when it should be abiding by peacetime rules.
135
 
Given the fact that the “battlefield” in the war with al Qaeda and its associated forces 
could be anywhere, the “forever war” becomes all the more troubling. In terms of 
detention without charge or trial, the Supreme Court upheld that the AUMF had 
“implicitly authorized” the President’s right to detain “enemy combatants” during war in 
its 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
136
And in 2012, President Obama signed the 
National Defense Authorization Act, which included section 1021 which called for 
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“affirmation of authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered 
persons pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force.”137  
Through the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi and the Executive branch’s 
interpretations of the authorization, the AUMF and the war on terror have become locked 
in a vicious cycle. As U.S. military operations diminish core al Qaeda, new threats, often 
deemed affiliates or associated forces, emerge. The President then invokes the AUMF to 
pursue the new threats, thereby justifying the need for the AUMF in the first place. In this 
forever war the executive branch has put forth a new “crisis paradigm” without a time 
limit.
138
 Despite the perpetuation of the conflict, statements from White House officials 
reflect at least some recognition of the need to end the conflict. While still arguing for the 
need to continue the conflict at present, Jeh Johnson echoed Kenneth Roth’s sentiments 
on war and said, “‘War’ must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of 
affairs . . . War violates the natural order of things . . . In its 12
th
 year, we must not accept 
the current conflict, and all that it entails, as the ‘new normal.’”139 And, during his 
remarks at the National Defense University in May 2013, President Obama pithily stated, 
“This war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our 
democracy demands.”140 Actions, however, have not followed these remarks, and the 
conflict, coupled with ever-expanding executive war powers, continues.      
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Part IV: Policy Options for the AUMF 
 
 With no end to the conflict against al Qaeda and its associated forces in sight, a 
significant first step in curbing the slow creep of executive power must involve repealing 
the AUMF and updating the authorization regime. This is not a novel suggestion. The 
AUMF has drawn the ire of politicians from the left and the right, as well as across the 
political spectrum in the media. With each new controversial news piece on the “war on 
terror,” the media releases a salvo of op-ed pieces demanding the repeal of the broad 
congressional authorization. The New York Times published a notable editorial in March 
2013 calling for the immediate repeal of the AUMF.
141
 Numerous other op-eds have 
echoed the call from The New York Times, and think tanks such as the Hoover Institute 
and Wilson Center have provided frameworks for a repealing the AUMF or drafting a 
new one. In Congress, legislators have proposed bills to diminish or repeal the force 
authorization.
142
 Even President Obama himself expressed his desire to “refine, and 
ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”143  
In spite of all of the calls for reform, the AUMF remains firmly in place. In order 
to begin to reverse the destructive trend of executive overreach, Congress must repeal the 
AUMF and, in partnership with the executive branch, pursue a series of comprehensive 
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reforms to “update” the AUMF. The two branches should work together to tie these 
reforms to the areas where the AUMF has unduly expanded executive power: enemy 
targets, purpose of the conflict, geographical scope, military resources and methods, and 
timing and procedural restrictions.       
Criteria for Policy Options  
 In considering the merits and drawbacks of a number of policy options relating to 
AUMF reform, or maintenance of the status quo, policymakers should consider three 
criteria: political feasibility, addressing threats to national security, and maintaining 
national interest, each with equally weighted importance. Whether the reform originates 
in the executive, judicial, or legislative branch, policymakers should carefully assess the 
political possibility of such a proposal succeeding. No matter how valuable the proposal 
may appear on other fronts, if the proposal has little political feasibility, then the law 
simply will not pass, especially in the current polarized climate of the “do nothing” 
Congress. Given the diverse range of vested interests of the various actors in the AUMF 
including the military-industrial complex, Congress, the President, human rights 
advocacy groups, and others, touching the current AUMF will cause a great deal of 
political friction. Therefore, policymakers must include these sometimes disparate 
interests in their reform calculus.  
 Equally important in deciding whether to keep, repeal, or replace the current 
AUMF is an analysis of how the authorization will allow the United States to protect 
itself from current threats. Policymakers should either address how the current or new 
AUMF will address emerging or perennial threats to U.S. national security or how other 
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defense mechanisms could take over in place of the AUMF. Coverage of new and 
emerging threats should factor into the national security calculus to avoid an 
authorization from growing obsolete too quickly, as the current AUMF has.  
 In addition to political feasibility and a consideration of the threat to U.S. national 
security, policymakers should consider how closely the new or reformed legislation 
aligns with U.S. national interests and core values. At Northwestern University’s School 
of Law in March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder articulated this priority: “Just as 
surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of laws and values. Even when 
under attack, our actions must always be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution—
and must always be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law, and our 
founding ideals.”144 In crafting new legislation, policymakers should avoid double 
standards or contradictions that could undermine U.S. influence or prestige abroad. 
Keeping in mind the distinction between war and peace, the new policy should not 
perpetuate the forever war. Policymakers should also remain cognizant of how such an 
authorization could change future American values or ideas by setting new precedents 
and practices.   
Policy Options:  
a.) Status quo 
 In exploring options for the future of the AUMF, threats to U.S. national security, 
and executive war powers, decision makers must analyze the merits of maintaining the 
status quo, which would involve preserving the AUMF in its current form, as a viable 
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policy option. In terms of political feasibility, preserving the AUMF is popular among 
vested interests. For elected officials, the “war on terror” still scores favorable ratings in 
public opinion polls, although they are slowly diminishing. According to a February 2014 
poll administered by Gallup, 77% of participants ranked international terrorism as a 
“critical” threat to vital U.S. interests in the next 10 years.145 In the same poll, just under 
half of the participants saw the U.S. military action in Afghanistan as a mistake.
146
 
Though the second figure may seem high, any number less than a majority certainly does 
not constitute a large enough constituency to mobilize an effective movement to repeal 
the AUMF. Given the general sentiment of the importance of the war on terror, elected 
officials may view challenging the status quo as politically risky, and may therefore lack 
incentives to try to change the well-entrenched legislation.  
 Military leaders similarly lack incentives to challenge the AUMF status quo. 
Major General Michael Nagata stated that he had “not yet encountered a situation where 
there was insufficient legal authority for the combatant commander to execute the 
mission or the direction he has been given.”147 Under the AUMF, military commanders 
have been granted significant latitude to pursue their targets and execute their mission 
objectives. Repealing or replacing the AUMF could mean forfeiting that legal freedom to 
operate in the field. Given the vested interests of both political and military actors to 
maintain the status quo, the few bills introduced in Congress have gained little traction.  
                                                          
145
 “War on Terrorism” Gallup, accessed April 27, 2014, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/war-
terrorism.aspx#1>. 
146
 Ibid.  
147
 “Hearing to Receive Testimony,” 12.  
52 
 
 
 
 Preservation of the status quo as a viable policy option is also buoyed somewhat 
by the second criterion: addressing U.S. national security. Some may argue that the 
AUMF finally grants the president the self-defense powers that the Framers had 
envisioned when they provisioned the war powers. Alexander Hamilton explained the 
need for an open-ended self-defense mechanism during his advocacy for the Constitution: 
The circumstances which may affect the public safety are [not] reducible within 
certain determinate limits, . . . it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence 
that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense 
and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficacy.
148
   
The indeterminate limits of the AUMF have certainly granted, one could argue, the 
president the authority to “provide for the defense and protection of the community.” 
This line of argument could extend across all realms of the war on terror, including 
detention. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have relied on the AUMF to legally 
justify the indefinite detention of “enemy combatants.” Therefore, upon the repeal or 
replacement of the AUMF, Congress and the president would have to figure out “how to 
deal with prisoners of war in the absence of a specific war.”149 With a change in the 
status quo, the premature release of potentially dangerous detainees could threaten U.S. 
national security.  
Intelligence also plays into considerations of U.S. national security. Drone strikes 
offer a good example of how classified intelligence could back up the claim that the 
AUMF best serves the United States’ national security concerns. Much of the scrutiny 
brought down upon the controversial drone strike program, along with the AUMF, comes 
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from a fundamental trust gap between the American people and intelligence agencies or 
appointed officials, as opposed to elected officials. Even though no published data exists 
on drone strikes, some counterterrorism experts have suggested that CIA tradecraft lends 
itself to accurate and reliable drone strikes with the most minimal collateral damage.
150
 
During the Bush Administration’s “war on terror,” Harold Koh, sitting as dean of Yale 
Law School, counted among the president’s staunchest critics, even penning an article 
entitled “Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?”151 However, Koh seemed to change his 
tune after assuming his post as Legal Adviser of the Department of State in 2009. Koh 
shifted from the war on terror’s chief critic to its “defender-in-chief.”152 In a 2010 
statement, Koh assured the American public, “Our procedures and practices for 
identifying lawful targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to 
make our targeting even more precise.”153 Setting political explanations for Koh’s change 
of heart aside, one explanation could be that, after seeing the intelligence on the targets 
covered under the AUMF, Koh felt that the law justified the killings. 
 But these national security arguments may have held more weight in the few 
years following the passage of the AUMF. Since 2001, the AUMF has allowed for the 
dismantlement of al Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks on September 11. 
However, in today’s shifting threat landscape, the status quo option of keeping the 
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AUMF fully intact is becoming harder to justify by the national security criterion. In 
2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta famously declared that the United States 
had “decimated” and “demoralized” core al Qaeda due to the kill and capture of top al 
Qaeda leadership including Osama bin Laden, Shaikh Saeed al-Masri, Atiyah Abd al-
Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
154
  
Despite these decisive victories over al Qaeda, military operations have continued 
to expand to meet the evolving threat. In a hearing on the AUMF, Senator John McCain 
voiced his concerns over using the AUMF to address these new threats to national 
security: 
 We are now killing people in the Haqqani Network . . . The reason why I bring 
that up, we did not even designate the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization 
until 2012. And there are published reports, which are not as a result of classified 
briefings that I have had, that we have killed people that their direct association 
with al Qaeda is tenuous. In fact, there is one story that we killed somebody in 
return for the Pakistanis to kill somebody.
155
 
Though threats to national security, specifically from terrorist organizations, continue to 
plague the United States, these threats have grown increasingly less connected to al 
Qaeda. Because the AUMF does not legally extend to all groups who now threaten the 
United States, the national security argument for maintaining the status quo is becoming 
obsolete.   
 The status quo option also falls short when considering the policy criterion of 
maintaining U.S. core values and national interests. Because the AUMF has enabled 
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significant executive overreach even in pro-executive interpretations of constitutional war 
powers, the retention of the AUMF disrupts the balance of power and renders ineffective 
the system of checks and balances in U.S. government. Justice Jackson’s noteworthy 
concurrence in his 1952 Youngstown decision perfectly describes the stakes involved in 
the type of unilateral presidential action enabled by the AUMF:  
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his 
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter . . . Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must 
be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by 
our constitutional system.
156
 
As the AUMF continues to expand presidential war powers, Justice Jackson’s heralded 
“equilibrium” slowly disintegrates. Such brash actions taken since the passage of the 
AUMF by the executive branch risk to undermine presidential legitimacy at home and 
U.S. prestige abroad.  
b.) Repealing the AUMF: 
 Because of the unsustainability and detrimental effects of the AUMF, the 
president and Congress should embark on an overhaul of the AUMF and authorization 
regime, starting with repealing the law from 2001. Only by first repealing the AUMF can 
Congress begin to meaningfully curb executive overreach in the use of military force and 
end the state of perpetual war. Although difficult, the political feasibility of repeal is not 
impossible; bills to this effect have already been proposed by members of Congress. In 
June 2013, Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), a senior member of the Intelligence 
Committee, proposed a bill to repeal the AUMF, citing as reasons that al Qaeda had 
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largely been degraded and that “Congress never intended and did not authorize a 
perpetual war.”157 While recognizing the need for the United States to remain vigilant 
against “specific networks of violent extremists,” Rep. Schiff’s proposed bill “urges the 
President to work with the legislative branch to secure whatever new authorities may be 
required to meet the threat and comply with the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, 
and the law of war.”158 The bill, which called for the repeal of the AUMF effective on 
December 31, 2014, won 185 votes in favor.
159
 Though the bill did not garner enough 
votes to pass the House, the affirmative votes signalled at least the beginning of political 
support for ending the AUMF’s mandate.  
 Another boon to the political feasibility of repealing and updating the AUMF is 
the existence of many high-profile endorsements for reform. In 2010, John B. Bellinger 
III, who served as the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State and the National 
Security Council during the Bush administration, penned an op-ed for the Washington 
Post, in which he called for Congress to “update and clarify” the “sparsely worded statute 
that Congress passed hastily on Sept. 18, 2001, while the wreckage of the World Trade 
Center was still smoldering.”160 His main criticism comes from the lack of specificity in 
the broadly worded authorization; Bellinger argues that the AUMF does not explicitly 
authorize detentions, targeting U.S. citizens, and other activities that the Bush and Obama 
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administrations have felt entitled to carry out backed by the authorization. This criticism 
and call for repeal carries more weight coming from an insider such as Bellinger.  
 Transcending political and security considerations, repealing the AUMF is 
imperative if Congress and the president hope to uphold U.S. core values. For all of the 
problematic aspects of the AUMF, the solution begins with repeal. In terms of restoring 
the separation of power and reasserting Congress’ role in war and foreign policy, the 
debates leading up to the ultimate repeal of the legislation will force members of 
Congress to confront the war on terror both politically and intellectually. This will mark 
an important first step for Congress to reclaim its war powers. In terms of the tradeoff 
between civil liberties and security, repealing the AUMF will undercut the legal 
justifications for extrajudicial detentions and infringements on the privacy of U.S. 
citizens. In the absence of the AUMF, the executive branch can no longer claim to carry 
out due process for U.S. citizen targets of lethal force. 
 Rather than only repealing the law, Congress and the president must update the 
authorization regime in order to address the current threat landscape. The feasibility of 
repealing the AUMF is inextricably linked with highly politicized concerns over 
maintaining U.S. national security in the absence of a statutory force authorization. While 
perhaps in the minority, some argue that a combination of the president’s Article II 
constitutional authority and law enforcement tools offers sufficient authority and 
capabilities for the United States to maintain robust national security.
161
 In their view, 
such authority holds even in the absence of the AUMF. This Article II, Section 2 
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argument, however, tends on the extreme side of pro-Executive interpretations and 
perpetuates the trend of Executive overreach. Robert Chesney et al point out a few 
shortcomings of a heavy reliance on Article II, Section 2 authority in their article “A 
Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats.”162 Due to the demonstrated 
protracted nature of the conflict, policymakers should keep in mind changing strategies as 
new administrations come to power. Certain administrations might feel more secure 
exercising Article II authority than others. Therefore, from a pragmatic perspective, it 
would be risky to rely on a potentially inconsistent policy in such a high-value item as 
national security. Also keeping national security in mind, the president would run into 
murky legal water in attempting to detain potentially dangerous criminals without 
statutory coverage.
163
   
 Should Congress repeal the AUMF, another question arises of whether or not law 
enforcement capabilities can sufficiently deal with new and emerging terrorist threats. In 
the 2013 Senate hearing on the AUMF, Assistant Secretary Sheehan explained, “Even 
prior to the AUMF, we were able to arrest people and try them and bring them back to 
the United States with great efficacy prior to September 11.”164 These capabilities, as 
Attorney General Holder pointed out in his speech at Northwestern, have only 
strengthened through greater cooperation between domestic law enforcement and foreign 
intelligence agencies in the post-9/11 United States.
165
 Additionally, not all situations 
require military responses. However, situations have arisen in the past in which the 
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president needed statutory authority to prosecute an effective military response. For 
example, in 1998, President Clinton struck terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and 
Sudan because “law enforcement and diplomatic tools” had proved ineffective in meeting 
this national security challenge.
166
 
 Given the national security considerations in the absence of a force authorization, 
Congress and the executive branch should pursue a comprehensive, pragmatic update of 
the authorization regime to address new threats, while still aligning with U.S. core values 
and avoiding the troubling legacies of the AUMF. This tact would prove much more 
politically feasible than only repealing the AUMF. Future authorizations must take care 
to limit the targets, purpose, geographical scope, military resources and methods, and 
duration of the conflict.   
I. Actions for Congress 
 In order to come back into the fold in foreign policy and national security, 
Congress must structure a new authorization system to ensure constant consultation with 
the president. From the report by Robert Chesney et al at the Hoover Institution, 
Congress should adopt aspects of the “general criteria plus listing” recommendation, in 
which legislators formalize general statutory criteria by which the president may list 
groups or individuals matching the criteria and carry out lethal force against them. Such 
criteria could allow an expedited authorization process on organizations “with sufficient 
capability and planning that it presents an imminent threat to the United States” or “any 
group or person that has committed a belligerent act against the U.S. or imminently 
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threatens to do so.”167 While this approach does well to engage Congress and encourage 
transparency through the listing process, fully subscribing to this recommendation still 
grants the executive too much discretion by allowing the president to choose the 
organizations and individuals against whom lethal force is authorized.  
 One way to sufficiently curb presidential power in the “general criteria plus 
listing” approach is to accommodate parts of a bipartisan bill proposed by Senators John 
McCain and Tim Kaine called the War Powers Consultation Act of 2014.
168
 Disheartened 
by the often ignored War Powers Resolution, the two senators called for a repeal and 
replacement of the 30 year old law. While fully repealing the law may prove unnecessary 
or politically difficult, many of the aspects of the bill, developed by the 14-month long 
National War Powers Commission, can be incorporated into the updated AUMF.
169
 
While still developing general criteria for terrorist organizations, Congress should follow 
the senators’ lead in forming a permanent Joint Congressional Consultation Committee 
(JCCC) consisting of majority and ranking members of the committees relating to 
national security.
170
  
 Instead of immediately employing lethal force after deeming a certain terrorist 
organization in accordance with statutory criteria, the president should first meet with the 
JCCC after deeming an organization or individual as meeting the criteria (except in cases 
of an imminent threat, in which case the president’s Article II emergency powers would 
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still hold). After meeting with the JCCC, the president may commence with hostilities, 
but members of JCCC must take a vote in support or opposition of an expedited 
authorization within 30 days. Similarly to the War Powers Resolution, if the president 
fails to secure a majority vote, the military action must end after the grace period. Such 
an arrangement strikes a balance between the exigencies of war and the need for 
congressional consultation.  
 Even with this approach, perpetuating the “crisis paradigm” and the forever war 
should still concern members of Congress. In drafting the new law, legislators must 
include a “sunset” provision of a set duration of time after which the entire expedited 
authorization system is subjected to review and renewal.
171
 If Congress fails to renew the 
legislation, then the sunset provision would immediately repeal the authorizations. To 
assure strict presidential compliance of the new system, something that has eluded the 
War Powers Resolution, Congress should include statutory punitive measures, which 
would trigger in the event of presidential violation of the updated AUMF. As per the Cato 
Institute’s policy recommendation called “Reclaiming the War Power,” Congress should 
defund “any such deployment that lacks the prior approval of Congress.”172 As Benjamin 
Wittes writes in his blog “Lawfare,” “There are many possible ways for Congress to 
authorize and guide the conflict—temporally, geographically, and in terms of the 
definition of the enemy.”173 This new authorization system aims to let Congress dictate 
each of these conflict areas on a case-by-case basis.  
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II. Actions for the President 
 Although Congress will drive the lion’s share of AUMF reform, the president 
should also take actions to curb executive power in the interests of U.S. national security 
and core values. This is not an implausible request. To start reversing the trend of 
executive overreach, the Obama administration can make good on some of its promises. 
In his landmark speech at the National Defense University in May 2013, President 
Obama cautioned against “continu[ing] to grant Presidents unbound powers” while 
promising to refuse to sign any “laws designed to expand [the mandate of the AUMF] 
further.”174 While containing executive power is a good start, the Obama administration 
should also implement measures to roll back those powers.  
 After leaving his post as Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, Harold 
Koh delivered his speech “How to End the Forever War?” at the Oxford Union in May 
2013, in which he outlined his three part plan to accomplish what his speech title 
suggested: “(1) Disengage from Afghanistan, (2) Close Guantanamo, and (3) Discipline 
Drones.”175 In these three legacies of the AUMF, President Obama has either made 
progress or at least intimated at his desire to comply with Koh’s tenets to end the forever 
war. In Afghanistan, the Obama administration has prepared the Pentagon to carry out 
full troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
176
 Other reports have 
suggested that the troop count will drop as low as 10,000 post-2014, the minimum troop 
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count recommended by the U.S. Department of Defense.
177
 These reports, should they 
come to fruition, demonstrate a real desire on the Obama administration to begin scaling 
back the perpetual war. Guantanamo Bay, on the other hand, represents an area where 
Congress has stalled reform. In his 2014 State of the Union Address, President Obama 
urged Congress to lift restrictions on detainee transfers in order to close the Guantanamo 
Bay detention facility, in order to remain “true to our Constitutional ideals” and set an 
example for the rest of the world.
178
 His recent emphasis shows a renewed effort, as 
President Obama has not mentioned the facility in his past four State of the Union 
addresses.
179
 Progress in the disciplining of drone strikes is much more difficult to 
discern because of public disclosure issues. However, in his National Defense University 
speech, President Obama announced his signing of the “Presidential Policy Guidance,” 
which cryptically mentioned a guiding framework for the use of force against 
terrorists.
180
 Because he no longer faces the pressures of reelection, President Obama 
should utilize his final years in office to deliver on his campaign promises and end the 
limitless mandate of the AUMF.   
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Conclusion: 
 The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11
th
, 2001 
fundamentally changed how Americans viewed the world and lived their everyday life. 
Congress and the president reacted to this change by passing the AUMF and forging a 
new crisis paradigm for the post-9/11 United States.  Since the hazy, frenetic few days 
after the passage of the AUMF, the crisis paradigm has allowed the U.S. Armed Forces 
and intelligence agencies to dismantle al Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks, and 
splinter its terrorist networks. But the war on terror came with heavy costs. Leaving a 
trail of unintended consequences, the force authorization eroded civil liberties, allowed 
the U.S. government to carry out extrajudicial killings, and transformed the conflict with 
al Qaeda into a war without end.  
 The purpose of this paper is not to analyze whether the ends justified the means. 
Some have even argued that the ends are not what they seem, taking into consideration 
blowback from drone strikes and the inspiration of emerging radical terrorist groups. 
Rather, this paper aims to provide a framework for Congress and the president to 
establish a new paradigm, one in which the separation of powers set out by the 
Constitution is restored, while still allowing for the United States to remain safe and 
secure. The AUMF did not spontaneously materialize; only the decades-long, nefarious 
trend of executive overreach could pave the way for such an expansive piece of 
legislation. In a meeting with Henry Kissinger in 1961, Harry Truman told the academic, 
“If the President knows what he wants, no bureaucrat can stop him. A President has to 
65 
 
 
 
know when to stop taking advice.”181 Future presidents should discard such radical pro-
Executive ways of thinking, and Congress should hold them accountable. Threats to U.S. 
national security are constantly evolving. In responding to those threats, Congress and the 
President must take care not to resort to self-cannibalization and do more harm than 
good. 
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